Abstract. This paper constructs a game-theoretic model of elections in alternative electoral systems with three or four candidates. Each electoral system specifies how the platforms of the candidates and their scores give rise to an outcome. When geometrical analysis shows that two outcomes can compete against each other for victory, a pivot probability is associated to that pair. Each voter is rational and picks the candidate that maximizes her expected utility, which results from the balancing of her preferences and beliefs about the pivot-probabilities. Candidate positioning is endogenous and the result of a Nash game. The possible equilibria are computed for plurality and runoff majority systems.
Introduction
This paper deals with the comparative analysis of positional equilibria under alternative electoral systems. Up to now, most electoral systems have been examined separately and in different frameworks. I propose a unified model of elections with sophisticated voting and endogenous platform positioning with three and four parties.
1 I assume strategic Nash choice of platforms by candidates, as most of the literature with endogenous positioning.
The behavior of voters is a more controversial issue. Early literature considered sincere voting, but this assumption is unreasonable for many situations, and there is strong empirical evidence for sophisticated voting (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973) . Recent literature therefore examined sophisticated voting, and even strategic voting (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Besley and Coate, 1997. . . ) . This paper takes an intermediate view, which was proposed by Myerson and Weber (1993) : voters are rational and therefore able of sophisticated voting, but are not really able to interact with each other. Therefore, they take into account the available information regarding how strong the candidates are and try not to waste their vote on unlikely winners: they maximize their expected utility.
The literature regarding majority or plurality elections is quite extensive. Negative results have been emphasized: plurality elections can lead to the election of a less preferred candidate (see, for example, Fishburn, 1986; Wright and Riker, 1989) .
The basic problem with a majority system when there are three or more candidates is a coordination problem: if the overall preferred candidate is perceived as having negligible chances of being in contention for victory, then voters are likely to vote for their favorite candidate among the two serious candidates. This is what often happens in the United Kingdom for example, where voters avoid "wasting" their vote on the Liberal Democrats as everybody expects either the Conservative or Labour parties to win.
This means that beliefs play a key role in elections. This idea that beliefs about the probabilities of close races between the pairs of candidates influences the behavior of the voters as well as the positioning of the candidates was modeled by Myerson and Weber (1993) . They, too, proved that when there are more than two candidates in a plurality system, any policy may win in equilibrium. The idea of the proof is that in such a strategic voting setup, a candidate can be deterred from deviating closer to the median position, because his credibility can be lower in such a configuration and exclude him from the race for victory.
The literature regarding runoff systems is quite limited. Fishburn and Brams (1981) show that a runoff election is not always able to elect the strict Condorcet candidate (corresponding to the candidate positioned the closest to the median). But their analysis holds the positioning of the candidates fixed. Myerson and Weber (1993) only compare plurality and approval voting systems. The present work extends their model. It proposes a geometric interpretation of their belief concept that can be applied to a broad range of commonly observed electoral systems, and therefore enables me to compare them.
Informally stated, the idea of the model is as follows. Each electoral system specifies how the platforms and scores of the candidates give rise to an outcome. A pivot-probability is associated to a pair of outcomes if geometrical analysis shows that they can compete against each other for victory. Beliefs about the pivot-probabilities are given exogenously. I model how the voters' behavior depends on both their preferences and their beliefs. Taking the voters' behavior into account, the parties position in order to maximize their chances to be in government. In each electoral system, equilibria are computed under all possible states of beliefs.
